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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : Case No. 920139 
v. i 
DONALD L. JAEGER, I Priority No. 13 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
The following points are submitted in reply to the 
statements and arguments contained in defendant's responsive 
brief. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant implies that the parties dispute the 
jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court to review this case 
pursuant to a writ of certiorari (Brief of Respondent [Br. of 
Resp.] at 1). This is incorrect. The original jurisdiction of 
this Court to issue extraordinary writs and review decisions of 
inferior courts is not at issue. Utah Const, art. VIII, § 3; 
Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2 (Supp. 1992). The parties dispute the right 
of the State to directly appeal a preliminary hearing court order 
dismissing a first degree felony information based on a 
magistrate's conclusion that there is not probable cause to bind 
over a defendant for trial. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
ON CERTIORARI AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Defendant misstates the applicable standard of review 
for the third issue raised on certiorari review, that is, the 
ultimate correctness of the magistrate's conclusion that there 
was not probable cause to bind over defendant for trial. 
Citing State v. Berbv. 260 N.W.2d 798 (Wis, 1978), 
defendant asserts that this Court should review the magistrate's 
conclusion under an abuse of discretion standard and is "limited 
to determining whether there was competent evidence for the court 
to act on" (Br. of Resp. at 2). By relying on Wisconsin 
authority, defendant ignores Utah authority that states that a 
reviewing court "need show no deference to the magistrate's legal 
conclusion [of probable cause to bind over for trial]. . . but 
may conduct its own review of the [bindover] order." State v. 
Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1991). 
Additionally, the present issue is not whether the 
preliminary hearing magistrate properly exercised his discretion, 
but whether the court acted outside the bounds of its discretion 
by dismissing the information. If the State established that 
there was probable cause to support the information, then the 
preliminary hearing magistrate had no discretion; he was 
obligated to bind over defendant for trial. Utah R. Crim. P. 
7(h)(2) (Addendum D). As in any case where a plaintiff's claim 
is dismissed prior to a jury determination of its merits, the 
appellate court must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the dismissed information and, when so viewed, 
determine as a matter of law if there is any reasonable basis in 
the evidence to support the charge (Brief of Petitioner [Br. of 
Pet.] at 2). Accord State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 
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1989); Management Committee v. Gravstone Pines, 652 P.2d 896, 
897-88 (Utah 1982). If the preliminary hearing evidence is 
simply "conflicted or disputed," the dismissal of the information 
may not be sustained. Cf. State v. Workman, No. 910190, slip op. 
at 3 (Utah April 30, 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RULES AND STATUTES 
The addenda attached to the State's opening brief 
contain copies of all constitutional provisions, rules and 
statutes pertinent to the resolution of this case. However, 
because rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, has recently 
been redesignated, a copy of the new version of the rule has been 
reproduced in Addendum D of this reply brief. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
While both parties refer to defendant's statements 
concerning the shooting, defendant did not testify during the 
preliminary hearing. The State called Officer Peterson to 
testify as to his interview of defendant at the scene and to 
defendant's conflicting statements made during subsequent 
interviews (T. 66-88). (See Brief of Pet. at 5-6, 38-40, for 
complete discussion of the officer's testimony.) Defendant never 
related to Officer Peterson that Mary Brandt was despondent or 
suicidal; in fact, he never relayed any statement or reaction of 
Mary's (T. 66-88). At the scene, defendant told the officer that 
he had never touched the gun and had only touched Mary's wound 
once (T. 68, 75, 78, 82-83). Subsequently, when presented with 
the GSR tests, defendant told Officer Peterson that he may have 
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touched the gun with the palm of his hand and could have dry-
fired it on the night in question (T. 82-85). Contrary to 
defendant's present assertions (Br. of Resp. at 6-7), defendant 
never told the officer that he had taken Mary's pulse, turned her 
over when she was vomiting or otherwise provided her with first 
aid (T. 78). 
The only evidence concerning the victim's actions or 
state of mind was: (1) defendant's statements made to the officer 
and Mrs. Clark that Mary had left her daughter home alone (T. 70, 
119); (2) defendant's statement to Officer Peterson that it 
sounded like Mary was at a bar or party when she called him 
around 10:30 p.m. and that she did not return home until 
approximately midnight (T. 69-70); and (3) Mrs. Clark's testimony 
of her last conversation with her daughter, during which Mary was 
crying and expressed her desire to leave the home so she could 
"work things out" (T. 121). Nothing in the conversation 
suggested any suicidal inclination (jld. ) . Mrs. Clark stated that 
when awakened at 4:00 a.m. and told that her daughter was dead, 
her first reaction was to ask if Mary had taken something to kill 
herself. Mrs. Clark clarified that the only reason she asked was 
because defendant had earlier claimed that Mary was "heavy into 
drugs" (T. 120-21). (See Br. of Pet. at 10, 38-40, for full 
recitation of Mrs. Clark's testimony). 
The majority of the preliminary hearing testimony 
consisted of expert testimony presented by the State. This 
included testimony of Dr. Evan A. Leis, the associate state 
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medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Mary Brandt and 
subsequently performed experiments to determine if it was 
physically possible for Mary to have shot herself (T. 34-65); Mr. 
Kevin Smith, a criminalist with the Firearms and Tool Marks 
Section of the State Crime Lab, who analyzed the gunpowder 
residue tests taken of the victim's and defendant's hands (T. 88-
97); and Mr. James Gaskill, an assistant professor at Weber State 
University and the director of the State Crime Lab, who performed 
ballistic testing on the recovered weapon (T. 98-112). Defendant 
presented no expert testimony. 
The State's experts' testimonies have been extensively 
summarized in the State's opening brief (see Br. of Pet. at 6-9, 
41-47). Rather than restate that testimony in light of 
defendant's present assertions, the experts' testimonies have 
been reproduced in the addenda to this reply brief. 
Contrary to defendant's claims, the medical examiner 
did not testify that he had only been "employed as an assistant 
medical examiner for one and a half months at the time of Mary's 
death" nor that he only performed a test firing on one other 
occasion (Br. of Resp. at 9, 43 and n.22). Dr. Leis did not 
testify concerning his full record of employment, merely that he 
had been employed as a Utah State associate medical examiner 
since July 1, 1990 (T. 35). Similarly, Dr. Leis did not testify 
as to the total number of test firings he had done during his 
career, but stated that he had only done one other test firing 
"since I've returned to Utah" (T. 44). 
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More significantly, despite the implications in 
defendant's brief that Dr. Leis was inexperienced or that his 
opinions lacked foundation (Br. of Resp. at 43-36), these 
objections were not raised below. While defendant once objected 
to the medical examiner stating his opinion as to "manner of 
death" on the grounds that it was "a decision for the court" (T. 
48), defendant otherwise stipulated to the expert qualifications 
of the medical examiner (T. 35), did not question the 
qualifications of the other State's experts, and did not 
challenge the foundation for or reliability of their various 
opinions. (See Addendum A, B & C, for respective copies of Dr. 
Leis', Mr. Smith's and Mr. Gaskill's testimonies.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN ORDER DISMISSING AN INFORMATION BASED ON 
LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO BIND OVER IS A 
FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER AND, THEREFORE, THE 
STATE MAY DIRECTLY APPEAL. IN THE EVENT, 
THIS COURT CONCLUDES THAT THE STATE DOES NOT 
HAVE A RIGHT TO APPEAL, THE COURT SHOULD 
CONSIDER THIS MATTER UNDER ITS GENERAL WRIT 
POWERS AS NO OTHER JUST AND SPEEDY REMEDY 
EXISTS AT LAW, 
A. Reply to Defendant's Argument that the 
State Has No Right to Appeal an Order 
Dismissing An Information Based on Lack 
of Probable Cause to Bind Over. 
Both parties have extensively briefed the issue of the 
appealability of a preliminary hearing court order dismissing a 
first degree felony information for lack of probable cause to 
bind over for trial (compare Br. of Pet., Point I, with Br. of 
Resp., Point I). The State relies on the arguments in its 
€ 
opening brief but submits the following in reply to defendant's 
argument. 
Defendant incorrectly asserts that the State is 
attempting to "skirt" the jurisdictional issue (Br. of Resp. at 
21 n.12). To the contrary, the State has consistently argued 
that it is entitled to directly appeal the order of dismissal. 
In accord with the then-in-force decision in State v. Humphrey, 
794 P.2d 496 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that a bindover order is 
an appealable circuit court order), rev'd, State v. Humphrey, 823 
P.2d 464 (Utah 1991), the State timely appealed the circuit court 
order of dismissal and proceeded to brief the merits of the 
appeal. The jurisdictional issue was first raised in defendant's 
court of appeals brief when defendant argued that like the then-
existing right to seek appellate review of a bindover order, the 
State had the right to seek discretionary review of an order of 
dismissal based on a refusal to bind over but did not have the 
right of direct appeal (Brief of Respondent, No. 910132-CA, at 
18). Subsequently, this Court reversed the court of appeals' 
Humphrey holding by concluding that a bindover order was not a 
order of the circuit court and, therefore, not appealable. 
Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 468. The present parties then moved the 
court of appeals for supplemental briefing to address the 
applicability of the supreme court decision to this case. The 
court of appeals denied the motion, struck the scheduled oral 
argument, and summarily dismissed the State's appeal. State v. 
Jaeger, No. 910132-CA (Utah App. Jan. 7, 1992) (unpublished 
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opinion) (a copy of which reproduced in Addendum 4 of the State's 
opening brief). The State timely sought and was granted a writ 
of certiorari. Nothing in this procedure "skirts" the 
jurisdictional issue; just the opposite, the State has squarely 
presented the issue of the State's right to appeal a preliminary 
hearing court order of dismissal as the initial issue to be 
determined by this Court. 
Defendant claims that to accept the State's position 
that a preliminary hearing court order of dismissal of a felony 
information is a final appealable order, this Court must reject 
its rationale and reasoning in Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Br. of 
Resp. at 15). This is incorrect. The Humphrey opinion is 
correct as it applies to the issue decided, that is, the 
appropriate procedural course for a defendant to follow who seeks 
review of a preliminary hearing bindover order. However, the 
same reasoning is inapplicable to consideration of an order of 
dismissal based on a magistrate's conclusion that there is not 
probable cause to bind over a defendant for trial (Br. of Pet. at 
12-13). Acceptance of the State's position does not require 
modification of Humphrey's holding. It does require 
clarification of the opinion's dicta, the type of modification 
which this Court has previously recognized as both necessary and 
appropriate. See e.g. State v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 5 
(Utah November 30, 1992), pet, for reh'g pending; State v. 
Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 571-72 (Utah 1991). 
Defendant next asserts that none of the cases cited in 
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support of the State's analysis of its historical right to appeal 
a dismissal of a felony charging document specifically involve an 
appeal of a preliminary hearing magistrate's dismissal of a 
felony information (Br, of Resp. at 16-17, commenting on cases 
cited in Br. of Pet. at 16-17). This is correct. As fully 
discussed in Point I of the State's opening brief, a preliminary 
hearing magistrate could not dismiss a felony information prior 
to 1980. Instead, the magistrate's powers were limited to 
discharging the defendant or binding him over for trial. Van Dam 
v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325, 1326-27 (Utah 1977). In 1980, the 
preliminary hearing court's powers were statutorily expanded to 
allow for the adjudicatory power of dismissal. At the same time, 
the State's previous right to directly appeal a trial court's 
quashal or demurrer of an information was expanded to permit a 
direct appeal of any final judgment of dismissal of an 
information. Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(c)(1) (1980); Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 1992) (copies of the statutes are 
reproduced in Addendum 8 & 9 of the State's opening brief). (See 
Br. of Pet. at 16-22, for complete discussion.) 
Thus, prior Utah case law was necessarily limited to a 
discussion of the State's right to appeal a trial court's order 
of dismissal of a felony information because no other court was 
granted the right to dismiss the felony charging document. What 
defendant fails to acknowledge is the applicability of this case 
law to the current statutory scheme which now confers on a 
preliminary hearing court the right to perform the same 
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adjudicatory function. If the State has the right to directly 
appeal a trial court's pretrial dismissal of a felony information 
for lack of probable cause, does the nature (and hence 
appealability) of the order of dismissal change simply because 
the preliminary hearing court now exercises that same power of 
adjudication by dismissing the informatin and refusing to 
transfer jurisdiction to the trial court? Defendant fails to 
directly answer this question, relying instead on Humphrey's 
dicta and ignoring its expressed limitation. See Humphrey, 823 
P.2d at 466 n.3 ("We do not decide whether, under our current 
statutory scheme, there is a difference between quashal of a 
bindover order and dismissal of an information. We conclude only 
that the district court's authority to review defective 
informations includes the authority to review defective bindover 
orders.")• 
As a practical matter, a defendant is permitted at 
least two opportunities to seek review of the determination that 
he should stand trial. If a magistrate binds over a defendant, 
the defendant may initially challenge that determination by 
filing a motion to quash in the district court. Humphrey, 823 
P.2d at 468. The district court is not bound by the magistrate's 
ruling but decides de novo the issue of probable cause. JEci. at 
466. If the district court denies the motion to quash, the 
defendant may petition for interlocutory review by an appellate 
10 
court.1 Id. at 465-67. 
Yet, if defendant's argument is accepted, the State 
would be precluded from any review of a magistrate's 
determination that a felony prosecution should be terminated 
prior to trial. Applying defendant's reasoning, when as here, 
the preliminary hearing magistrate concludes that there is not 
probable cause to bind over a defendant and, therefore, releases 
the defendant and dismisses the felony information, the State's 
only recourse is to refile the information. But under State v. 
Brickeyf 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986), the State may not refile 
the information before another magistrate. Instead, the State 
must convince the same magistrate who dismissed the information 
that refiling is appropriate based on "new evidence or changed 
circumstances." This determination is not de novo, but limited 
to a determination of whether sufficient good cause exists to 
permit the refiling. jCd. Additionally, if the magistrate 
refuses to permit the refiling, defendant's reasoning would also 
preclude the State from any review of the Brickev determination. 
Despite the fact that a felony prosecution has been fully 
terminated, the State is, thus, relegated to a continual circular 
path before the same magistrate in hopes of convincing the 
magistrate that he has erred. At the same time, defendant is 
1
 It remains unclear whether a bindover order may also be 
challenged post-conviction. While this Court has suggested that 
conviction may moot the issue, Humphrey, 823 P. 2d at 467 n.6, 
defendant's counsel (Salt Lake Legal Defender Association) have 
advocated in another case that a bindover order may be challenged 
following conviction. State v. Ouas, 837 P.2d 565 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. No. 920228 (Utah December 23, 1992). 
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allowed at each stage to seek review from an independent tribunal 
of the propriety of allowing the prosecution to proceed to trial. 
No doubt recognizing the inequitable and insulating 
result of his position, defendant does not even attempt to argue 
that this was the legislative intent in enacting the statutes in 
question* Instead, claiming support in Humphrey's dicta, 
defendant argues that a preliminary hearing court order of 
dismissal is somehow less "final" than a district court order of 
dismissal (Br, of Resp., Point I), But when the effect of the 
preliminary hearing court order of dismissal is compared to the 
effect of a district court order of dismissal, the two are 
identical. Just as happened here, defendant charged with second 
degree murder has been released from custody and faces no pending 
criminal charges. 
As defendant acknowledges, the right of appeal has 
never been controlled by a determination of whether the State may 
refile a dismissed information (Br. of Resp. at 17). Yet, 
defendant states that State v. Thompson, 254 P. 147 (Utah 1927), 
would preclude the State from appealing a quashed information 
based on the State's ability to refile (id..)* Thompson does not 
support defendant's contention and, contrary to defendant's 
assertion, the State never "acknowledged" that it did. Thompson 
simply stands for the proposition that when the trial court 
orders an information dismissed but also orders the defendant to 
remain in custody and the State to refile the information, such 
an order "indicates affirmatively that no final judgment was 
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entered" and, therefore, the order of dismissal is not appealable 
(see Br. of Pet. at 17). 
Regarding the nature of preliminary hearings in first 
degree felony cases, defendant does not challenge the State's 
extensive discussion establishing that magistrates must operate 
as courts of records in hearing felony preliminary hearings 
(compare Br. of Resp. at 19, with Br. of Pet. at 22-24). 
Instead, defendant argues that e/en if the preliminary hearing 
court is a court of record, this is not determinative of the 
finality and appealability of its orders (Br. of Resp. at 19). 
While perhaps not wholly determinative, it is supportive of the 
State's position. As previously argued, the traditional 
functions of a magistrate, including the function of binding over 
a defendant for trial, are non-adjudicatory. (See supra at 8-9; 
Br. of Pet. at 16-22). Accord Van Dam, 571 P.2d at 1326-27. In 
exercising these ncn-adjudicatory powers, the judge is operating 
as a magistrate. But when a preliminary hearing court judge 
dismisses an information, that act is not a magisterial act; it 
is an adjudicatory act of the court in which the preliminary 
hearing is held. Cf. id. In the case of a first degree felony, 
such a dismissal may only occur in a court of record designated 
as a circuit court or higher (see Br. of Pet. at 22-24). 
B. Reply to Defendant's Argument that this 
Appeal May Not Be Properly Converted to 
a Writ. 
The State maintains that it is entitled to directly 
appeal the order of dismissal. However, if this Court concludes 
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that the State has no right to appeal, the State requests that 
its petition for writ of certiorari and subsequent briefing be 
considered as a petition for writ of mandamus (Br. of Pet. at 
28). Contrary to defendant's assertions (Br. of Resp. at 22-27), 
consideration of this case pursuant to this Court's original writ 
powers is entirely appropriate. Utah Const, art. VIII, § 3; Utah 
Code Ann. 78-2-2(2) (Supp. 1992); Utah R. App. P. 19; Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65(B). 
To clarify, the State is first requesting that this 
Court determine the jurisdictional issue. If the State has the 
right to appeal, the merits of the dismissal could then be 
appropriately considered. But if the State does not have the 
right to appeal the order of dismissal, the State has no other 
plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law in which the merits of 
the order of dismissal may be considered. (See Br. of Pet. at 
28, explaining why no other legal remedy exists.) Accord Hale v. 
Barker, 259 P.928, 931-32 (Utah 1927). While it is true that 
refiling of a dismissed information is procedurally permitted, 
such refiling is not a "remedy". Under Brickev, 714 P.2d at 647, 
a refiled information must be presented to the same magistrate. 
But refiling provides the State with no more of a remedy than a 
motion to reconsider a pretrial ruling provides any litigant. In 
fact, in light of Brickev, it provides less. For Brickev 
restricts the grounds for reconsideration to "new evidence or 
changed circumstances" and prohibits de novo consideration of the 
merits of the case. Id. at 647. 
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Defendant asserts that this Court should not consider 
this appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus "because the 
State has failed to follow the required procedure for petitioning 
for a writf has not delineated the grounds on which a writ is 
sought, and has failed to establish that mandamus in necessary 
and appropriate" (Br. of Resp. at 22-23). Defendant's criticisms 
are without merit. \ 
While couched in part as a procedural argument, 
defendant's argument is actually substantive. Defendant does not 
claim that he lacks notice of the State's grounds for seeking 
extraordinary review. Further, defendant concedes that an 
extraordinary writ is the appropriate remedy to review a claim 
that the lower court abused its discretion or exceeded its 
jurisdiction (Br. of Resp. at 25). But defendant argues that the 
issue here falls into neither category as the State is simply 
"not happy" with the preliminary hearing court's exercise of 
discretion (Br. of Resp. at 25-27). 
Defendant's assertion is not correct. While the State 
agrees that a writ is not a proper avenue to review the propriety 
of a mere exercise of discretion, that is not the issue before 
this Court. "Discretion 'encompasses the power of choice among 
several courses of action, each of which is considered 
permissible." Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 
26 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting R. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 
759 (1976)). But as previously discussed, supra at 2-3, the 
question to be ultimately decided is whether as a matter of law 
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probable cause to bind over was established* If so, the 
preliminary hearing court had no legal discretion to refuse to 
bind over defendant for trial and no legal right to refuse to 
transfer jurisdiction to the district court. Humphrey/ 823 P.2d 
at 465-66 and n.2 (a bindover order transfers jurisdiction of the 
case from the preliminary hearing court to the trial court); Utah 
R. Crim. P. 7(h)(2) (if probable cause is established, a bindover 
order must issue). Accord Anqell v. Sixth Judicial District 
Court of Sevier County, 656 P.2d 405, 407 (Utah 1982) (while a 
change of venue is a matter of discretion, a trial court has no 
legal discretion to refuse a change of venue when the movant has 
established his right to the change as a matter of law); State, 
Ex Rel. Cannon v. Learv, 646 P.2d 727, 729 (Utah 1982) (if an 
information has been properly brought, a court has no discretion 
to dismiss it); Herzoq v. Bramel, 25 P.2d 345, 346 (Utah 1933) 
(while a court may have discretion in ruling on a motion to 
dismiss, the court may not divest itself of jurisdiction by 
arbitrarily granting the motion anymore than it could arbitrarily 
assume jurisdiction). Contrary to defendant's assertions (Br. 
of Resp. at 26), Utah law is very clear that when a lower court 
refuses to do an act it is legally required to do or refuses to 
transfer jurisdiction as legally mandated, the appropriate remedy 
is a writ of mandamus. Anqell, 656 P.2d at 407 (mandamus will 
lie to compel a change of venue where it has been established 
that the movant was entitled to the change); Ex Rel. Cannon, 646 
P.2d at 729 (mandamus is appropriate remedy where an information 
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was erroneously dismissed); Herzoq, 25 P.2d at 346 (mandamus is 
proper where lower court improperly dismissed a cause of action); 
Pace v. Wolfe, 289 P. 1102, 1103 (Utah 1930) (mandamus is proper 
to compel a change of venue); Hale, 259 P. at 931-32 (mandamus is 
appropriate remedy to correct an improper transfer of a case to 
another court). 
For these reasons, should this Court determine that the 
State has no right to appeal, the State petitions this Court to 
review the merits of the State's claims pursuant to this Court's 
inherent writ powers. Extraordinary review is especially 
appropriate where at the time of the original appeal, then-
existing law reasonably supported the State's belief that it had 
the right to file a direct appeal. See Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 
(court of appeals erroneously concluding that a bindover order 
was an appealable order of the circuit court); State v. Ortega, 
751 P.2d 1138, 1139 n.2 (Utah 1988) (four of the current members 
of the Utah Supreme Court concurring in opinion which stated in 
dicta that the State had the right to appeal a circuit court 
order dismissing an information based on the preliminary hearing 
magistrate's conclusion that there was not probable cause to bind 
over the defendant on a charge). 
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POINT II 
THE PRIMA FACIE STANDARD FOR PROBABLE CAUSE 
TO BIND OVER FOR TRIAL IS NO LONGER 
APPLICABLE IN UTAH; INSTEAD, THE STANDARD HAS 
BEEN REDUCED TO A LEVEL OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
EQUIVALENT TO THAT REQUIRED UNDER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT. 
The State argued in its opening brief that the 
preliminary hearing court applied the wrong legal standard in 
assessing probable cause (Br. of Pet., Point II). The State 
fully relies on that argument and adds the following matters in 
response to defendant's brief. 
Defendant contends that if the preliminary hearing 
court cannot fully access credibility, the fundamental purpose of 
the inquiry will be undermined (Br. of Resp. at 31-32). This is 
incorrect. While a primary purpose of a preliminary hearing is 
to "ferret out groundless and improvident prosecutions", this 
purpose is fully met when a magistrate's credibility assessments 
are limited to "groundless" "implausible" testimony, that is 
evidence which is either physically impossible to be true or "its 
falsity [is] apparent, without any resort to inferences or 
deductions." State v. Workman, No. 910190, slip op. at 4 (Utah 
April 30, 1993). (See Br. of Pet. at 32-36, for complete 
discussion). Defendant ignores that an equally important second 
purpose of a preliminary hearing is to allow a defendant "to 
fully inform himself of the facts upon which the state relies to 
sustain the charge made against him, and be prepared to meet them 
at the trial." State v. Jensen, 96 P. 1085, 1086 (Utah 1908). 
The standards advocated by the State fully comport with these 
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purposes. 
The State's position of the limited role of the 
magistrate's in assessing the crediblity and weight of the 
evidence is in accord with the rule that a determination of 
probable cause to bind over may be based in whole or in part on 
otherwise inadmissible evidence. Rule 7(h)(2), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, permits a preliminary hearing magistrate to 
consider hearsay evidence in determining probable cause and 
prohibits the magistrate from excluding evidence on the basis 
that it was unconstitutionally or illegally seized. 
POINT III 
BASED ON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DURING THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING, THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE 
TO BIND OVER DEFENDANT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Defendant concedes that there is no evidence to support 
three of the preliminary hearing court's findings: 
1. The magistrate erroneously found that 
particles found at defc^ . I'S workplace were 
both characteristic ana ci.^gi.-. of gunpowder 
residue. Defendant cc*:cedec zr.jt there was 
no evidence that particles unique to 
gunpowder residue were found (Br. of Resp. at 
40 n.18). Further, defendant does not 
dispute that Officer Peterson's testimony was 
only that he "believe[d]. . . but was not 
sure" that a characteristic particle was 
found (Br. of Resp. at 38 and n.17). 
2. The magistrate erroneously found that if 
Mary had fired the weapon, the reason why no 
gunpowder residue was found on her hands was 
that it rubbed off when her upper clothing 
was removed. Defendant appears to agree that 
there is no evidence to support such a 
finding but then argues that the erroneous 
finding is inconsequential (Br. of Resp. at 
42). 
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3. The magistrate erroneously found that the 
gun was located between Mary's legs. 
Defendant concedes that the gun was actually 
found a couple of feet away away from Mary 
(Br. of Resp. at 47). 
Defendant attempts to characterize the medical examiner 
as inexperienced and as expressing opinions without foundation 
(Br. of Resp. at 43). Both contentions are without support. 
When the medical examiner testified, the defense stipulated to 
his qualifications as an expert witness (T. 35), Defendant did 
not seek additional foundational information prior to the 
examiner expressing his various expert opinions. Nor, did the 
defendant attempt to undermine these opinions by substantially 
questioning their foundation on cross-examination. (See Addendum 
A, for complete testimony including cross-examination.) Further, 
the rules of evidence permit an expert to express his opinion 
without providing the underlying data and basis for that opinion. 
Utah Rule of Evid. 705. 
Below, defendant chose not to present expert testimony 
to contradict the medical examiner's opinion, chose not to 
challenge the reliability of the expert's opinion, and never 
argued that the medical examiner's testimony lacked credibility 
or reliability (T. 124-143). Since none of the evidence was 
"inherently improbable" but was, at best, only conflicted and 
disputed, the magistrate had no legal basis to invade the 
province of the ultimate fact-finder and judge the evidence's 
credibility and weight. Workman, slip op. at 3-4. 
Based on the evidence, probable cause to bind over for 
20 
trial was established as a matter of law. As such, the 
preliminary hearing court had no legal basis to refuse to bind 
over defendant for trial and no legal right to dismiss the felony 
information. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons asserted in the State's opening brief 
and advanced in this reply brief, the decision of the court of 
appeals dismissing the State's appeal for lack of jurisdiction 
should be reversed. This Court should review the substantive 
merits and determine, as a matter of law, that there is probable 
cause to bind over defendant for trial on the charge of second 
degree murder. Accordingly, this Court should remand this matter 
to the circuit court with directions to reinstate the information 
and bind over defendant for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /WA-day of May, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General-. 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
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A No, I don't know. 
MR. MAURO: Can I have a moment, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q (BY MR. MAURO) On those sacks, you grabbed those 
out of Mr. Jaegar's drawer? 
A The lunch sack over her hands? 
Q Yes. 
A I did. 
Q Were they new or used, do you know? 
A I don't know. 
Q They could have been used bags? 
A I don't know, it could have been. 
MR. MAURO: No further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is there any redirect by the State? 
MS. HORNACK: No other questions, Your Honor. We 
would ask that Exhibits No. 1 and 2, the pictures, be admitted 
into evidence. 
MS. REMAL: No objection, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Exhibits No. 1 and 2 will be admitted. 
Thank you for your testimony. You may step down. 
Call your next witness. 
MS. HORNACK: The state would call Dr. Lais. 
DR. EVAN A. LETS, 
called as a witness, being previously sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
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DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. HORNACK: 
Q Dr. Leis, will you please state your name and spell 
your last name for the record. 
A My name is Dr. Evan A. Leis, L-e~i-s. 
Q And what's our occupation, Dr. Leis? 
A I'm the associate medical examiner for the State of 
Utah. 
Q How long have you been employed in that capacity? 
A Since July 1 of 1990. 
Q All right. Will you stipulate to his qualifications 
for purpose of this hearing? 
MS. REMAL: Yes, Your Honor, for this hearing I 
would. 
MS. HORNACK: You will, thank you. 
Q (BY MS. HORNACK) On August 22, 1990 were you so 
employed in the capacity in which you just testified? 
A I was. 
Q All right. And on that day, did you have occasion 
at approximately 12:00 noon to perform an autopsy on a white 
female by the name of Mary Barndt? 
A I did. 
Q And what process and procedure did you use in 
performing that autopsy? 
A Well, in performing an autopsy, the first thing we 
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do is any collection of evidence on the external surface of 
the body; in this particular case, photography, finger prints, 
and collections of samples of scalp, pubic hairs were done as 
well as gunshot residue kits* After doing that, then I 
performed an external examination of the body documenting 
various features of the body for identification purposes and 
also documenting any injuries that were present. 
Q Okay* And after the external examination, what did 
you do? 
A Then an internal examination was performed examining 
the organs of the chest, abdominal and head cavities* 
Q And after the internal examination? 
A That pretty much finished the autopsy. 
Q All right. Dr. Leis, pursuant to your external 
examination, would you testify as to what you observed? 
A Okay. This was a white female of a young age. She 
had a gunshot in — wound to the lower left neck, left upper 
chest. I'll describe that in more detail later. In addition 
to that, she had a thoracotomy scar in which the surgeons had 
made an incision underneath the left breast to explore the 
left chest cavity. She also had a chest tube inserted in the 
ride side of her chest. As far as examination of the 
extremities, she had some bruising on the posterior right arm 
which were two small bruises, each less than an inch in size 
and also a faint bruise on the inside of the left upper arm. 
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1 Those were the main findings on the external examination. 
2 Q Okay. Other than the gunshot wound, was there 
3 anything else significant that you observed during the 
4 external examination? 
5 A No. 
6 Q Dr. Leis, can you please step forward to the 
7 mannequin and show where you observed the gunshot wound? 
8 A The entrance wound was located on the body overlying 
9 the left collar bone, which is in this region, right in this 
10 area here (indicating). 
11 Q And what was the angle of the wound? 
12 A Well, in examining the wound, we had the defect from 
13 where the projectile actually penetrated the skin, around that 
14 defect that was an elliptical abrasion collar, it was much 
15 thiner on this side than it was on this side, which would 
16 indicate that the bullet entered the body at an angle from 
17 down to up and from her right to her left. 
18 Q All right. And was there an exit wound found? 
19 A There was no exit wound. 
20 Q Okay. And where was the projectile or the bullet 
21 found in her? 
22 A The projectile was found on the back of the neck 
23 about in this region (indicating)• It was located eight 
24 and-a-half inches from the top of the head. 
25 Q Okay. Based upon the angle of the wound and where 
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the projectile is found in the entrance of the wound, could 
you tell how her arms were positioned when the bullet enter 
her body? 
A Not based on the angle of the wound. However, when 
the body was on the autopsy table and the arms are down by the 
side, the entrance wound was immediately over the head of the 
clavicle, in this region, and doing the external examination 
and reflecting this skin upwards, the bullet never struck the 
clavicle. And given the tract of the projectile, it was 
impossible for the bullet to go over the top of the clavicle, 
and had to go underneath the clavicle. For this to happen, 
the position of the arm at the time that the bullet struck the 
body, the arm would have to have elevated in this way 
(indicating). What this would cause is two things, it would 
cause the lateral aspect of the clavicle to be elevated and 
would also lift all of this subsequently, so that the 
projectile could strike the skin in this area and still pass 
underneath the collar bone. 
Q All right. So her arm would have had to be 
positioned similar to as it is located now? 
A Right, it would either have to be upwards or 
reaching like this or possibly behind the head, but the elbow 
would have to be elevated above shoulder height. 
THE COURT: Let the record reflect which arm you're 
referring to? 
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THE WITNESS: The left arm. 
Q (BY MS. HORNACK) The left arm. What about her 
right arm, is there any way to tell where her right arm was 
located at the time? 
A There isn't. 
Q All right. You can return to your seat. Dr. Leis, 
did you have an opinion as too the caliber of the projectile? 
A When the projectile was recovered, it was a small 
caliber, either a .22 or .25. 
Q All right. And with particularity, would you 
describe the gunshot wound as you saw it? 
A As far as range determination? 
Q Yes. Well, tell us what you observed around the 
gunshot wound? 
A Okay. Besides the collar of abrasion around the 
actual defect, there was also what we call stippling. In 
classifications of gunshot wounds there's usually three type, 
there's contact and — or close contact which are one type in. 
In this type, it means that the end of the barrel of the 
weapon is in close proximity to the skin surface, such that 
the projectile, the smoke, and the unburned gun powder flakes 
which exit the end of the barrel are all in a — form a small 
ring or are all thrust into the defect formed by the bullet as 
it passes through the skin. As a barrel is moved further and 
further from the target, it allows the particles other than 
JODY EDWARDS — CAPTTOT. vvurs^^voa 
40 
the bullet to expand somewhat and disburse* 
Our next clasification is intermediate range and 
what this means is that unburned flakes of gun powder or 
burning flakes of gun powder that exit impact with the skin 
surface and form multiple dots which we call stippling. This 
is is usually seen from say a half inch, depending on the 
weapon, from a half inch to an inch away from a skin surface 
or from a target to a foot, a foot and a half* 
Beyond the range where anything that exists the end 
of the barrel except for the bullet strikes the skin surface 
is called a distant gunshot wound or an indeterminate range, 
meaning that it could have occurred from a foot and-a-half to 
two feet to infinity or the range of the weapon. 
Q Okay. And did you observe any stippling around this 
gunshot wound? 
A I did. 
Q Okay. And did you measure that stippling? 
A Yes. What we do is we identify the pattern of 
stippling on the skin surface and then on four different 
quadrants we measure the distance from the actual center of 
the defect formed by the bullet passing through the skin. 
Q Okay. And you said that you identified the pattern 
of stippling, what was the pattern of stippling on the gunshot 
wound? 
A It was pretty much symmetrical on three of the four 
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sides. On the side closest to her midline, it measured 6.1 
centimetersf which is roughly 2 and-a-half inches from the 
center of the defect. Upwards on the upper aspect of the 
neck# it measured 6.8 centimeters, which would be 2 and 3/4 
inches. And below the defect, it measured up to 6.2 
centimeters away, which again would be roughly 2 and-a-half 
inches. The difference was on the aspect to the side where I 
could only identify stippling up to 2.8 centimeters, which 
would be just a little bit over an inch away from the center 
of the defect. To account for this, the position of the arm 
which would also elevate the clavicle, in this particular 
woman, she had fairly large size breasts as well, and in 
lifting the arm, the breast tissue and also the muscle of the 
chest wall is also elevated and forms sort of a ridge here and 
that could be partly responsible for knocking down or 
preventing the stippling and causing a shorter demarcation 
than when the body is released or the arm is lowered I mean, 
then the stippling pattern would appear more widely 
disburseed. However, I checked thoroughly on the left side of 
the chest and the left breast and saw no additional stippling 
on her. 
Q All right. What did you do with the four 
measurements that you took of the stippling? 
A The reason we take these measurements is the most 
accurate way to obtain a range determination for how far the 
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weapon was when it was fired is to take these measurements 
that we obtained from the body and compare those with test 
firings that are done. The same weapon is used, the same 
ammunition is used and a target is positioned on a wall and 
measurements are taken at various intervals* 
Q All right. Other than the test firing, were you 
able to determine anything from the stippling measurements 
that you took before you did the test firing? 
A All that that would tell me is that it's of an 
intermediate range. 
Q Which would mean what, how far away was the gun 
held? 
A As a rough estimate, I would say, without using the 
test firings, I would say around six to ten inches away. 
Q And, Dr. Leis, were you shown a possible murder 
weapon that was used in this case at the autopsy or subsequent 
to the autopsy? 
A I don't remember the exact date, it was a month or 
so after the autopsy. 
Q All right. But you were shown a possible murder 
weapon? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. And is the projectile found in Mary one 
that would be possible as coming from that murder weapon? 
A Yes. 
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Q All right* And did you actually perform some test 
firings using that murder weapon? 
A Right. Initially we had the crime lab, state crime 
lab did test firings using the weapon. If they followed 
standard procedures, they would have done that with the weapon 
at perpendicular to the targeting area. In this particular 
case, since — in looking at the tract of the bullet, as well 
as the abrasion collar and the fact that the bullet struck her 
as at angle, we repeated the test firings at our office and 
resimulated the angle of the projectile with respect to a flat 
surface and performed the test firings again. 
Q And who performed those tests at your office? 
A Rudy Reed who is one of our investigators for our 
office did the actual firing of the weapon while I performed 
the measurements. 
Q All right. And seeing what's marked up there as 
State's Exhibit No. 3, I believe, would be a gun? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recognize that gun? 
A Yes, that's the weapon that we used for the test 
firings. 
Q All right. And the test firings were performed 
when, approximately a month afterwards, I believe you said you 
saw the gun? 
A On December 6, 1990. 
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Q All right. And approximately how many test firings 
did you do? 
A We did beginning at 2 inches and for every inch up 
to 12 inches, 
Q All right. And what were the results of those test 
firings? 
A The results of our test firings indicated that in 
matching or comparing these stipplings — 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I'd object at this time 
unless the doctor can indicate that the material the test 
firings were done on were the same as or similar enough to 
skin that they would be relevant in this particular instance. 
THE COURT: I'll let you lay that as a foundational 
issue if it's significant or not, but I think it should be 
explored. 
MS. HORNACK: All right. 
Q (BY MS. HORNACK) Dr. Leis, do you perform test 
firings like this in other cases? 
A Rudy Reed and I have only done one other test firing 
on a case since I*ve returned to Utah. 
Q All right. Is this procedure done in your office in 
other cases? 
A The other one I did with Rudy was done in our 
office, otherwise the state crime lab is responsible for doing 
the test firings. 
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Q All right* And can you tell whether or not a test 
result on a piece of paper would be similar to a human body? 
A They're similar in the fact that if you use a white 
sheet of paper, the gun powder flakes that will also strike 
the skin surface and leave an imprint will also produce a 
imprint on a white sheet of paper. 
Q All right* Is there any significance difference 
between a sheet of paper and a human body that would cause 
different results? 
A None that I'm aware of* Although I know that on 
occasion, because obtaining human skin samples to do test 
firings is inappropriate, the closest sample that can be used 
or that has been used to actually reporduced these results is 
pig skin. 
Q All right. Would you please tell us what the test 
results were, then? 
MS. REMAL: Well, Your Honor, I'd still object. I 
think that he's indicated in his last comment that apparently 
paper is not considered a close enough substitute for human 
skin that it would be a reliable piece of evidence, and for 
that reason I'd object. 
MS. HORNACK: I think he indicated that it was, and 
it's been done before. 
THE COURT: I didn't hear it that way. I'd like you 
to just before, however, could you just explore the 
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reliability of this test? I'd like to be satisfied of that 
before we go forward. 
Q (BY MS. HORNACK) How reliable are the test results 
performed on a piece of paper? 
A To my knowledge, these are accurate enough to be 
used. 
Q Okay. Dr. Leis, will you please tell us what the 
test results were as you and your investigator performed them? 
A Okay. In our measurements in comparison with the 
stippling pattern seen on the body of the diceased, the range 
at which the weapon was fired that would match the 
measurements was between nine and ten inches away from the 
target surface. The results of the state crime lab were 
similar in that — 
MS. REMAL: Well, Your Honor, I'd object, I think 
he's relying on hearsay. 
Q (BY MS. HORNACK) Just tell us about the results of 
your test. 
THE COURT: All right, sustained. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. Between nine and ten inches of 
the range of fire. 
Q (BY MS.HORNACK) Okay. And did you use those test 
results in coming to any findings in your autopsy? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And what were those findings? 
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A In that the range from which the weapon was fired 
would be of a distance that would be very difficult for an 
individual to achieve to have a self-inflicted wound, 
Q All right. And could you tell from the angle of the 
wound or from the stippling or anything whether or not the gun 
would have had to have been held right-handed or left-handed? 
A Most likely it was right-handed since the projectile 
actually went from the deceased's right to her left. 
Q All right. Now, that was what you discovered as 
part of your external examination, what did you do as part of 
your internal examination? 
A In doing the internal examination, as I mentioned 
earlier, I found no injury to the clavicle or the collar bone. 
However, further back the projectile had struck the first rib 
which lies just — will contact your breast bone just beneath 
the clavicle and incurs upwards. This first rib was 
fractured, several of the bone fragments from that rib went 
into the left chest cavity and struck the lung. A small 
portion of projectile was shaved off and this went through the 
left chest cavity, and I was able to retrieve it behind the 
first rib on the back of the skin. The main portion of the 
projectile continued from her right to her left and slightly 
upward, and I recovered that roughly in this area of the upper 
back, lower neck (indicating), I believe approximately a 
quarter of an inch beneath the skin surface. 
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1 Q Anything else that you discovered significant in 
2 your internal examination? 
3 A The fact that the majority of blood loss must have 
4 been external in this individual, there was only forty cc's of 
5 blood that was actually present in the left chest cavity, 
6 which would be around a fifth of a cup of fluid, of blood, so 
7 most of the blood loss was external. The blood loss arose 
8 from the fact that the projectile severed almost entirely the 
9 left subclavian artery which is the made blood vessel which 
10 comes off the arch of the aorta and supplies blood to the left 
11 arm. 
12 Q And based — anything else in your internal 
13 examination? 
14 A That's i t . 
15 Q And based upon your observations and your 
16 performance of the autopsy, did you make any pathological 
17 diagnoses? 
18 A Yes. I certified the death as a result of a gunshot 
19 wound to the chest. 
20 Q And did you form an opinion as to the manner of 
21 death? 
22 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I'd object to that. I think 
23 that's a decision for the Court to make not for an expert to 
24 render for it. 
25 THE COURT: Ms. Hornack? 
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MS. HORNACK: He's a medical examiner, Your Honor, 
and I think that Ms. Remal stipulated to his expertise. I 
think he can tell the manner of death, not necessarily who did 
it or whatever, but he can certainly testify as to the manner 
of death. 
THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection and allow 
the opinion. 
Q (BY MS. HORNACK) Did you form an opinion as to the 
manner of death? 
A Yes, based upon the information from the autopsy as 
well as subsequent information from testing, I ruled the 
manner of death as homicide. 
Q All right. And what did you take into account or 
what were your reasons for determining that it was a homicide? 
A In this case, the particulars are whether this is a 
homicide or a suicide. Several of the factors are the 
location of the entrance wound. Typically in suicides the 
gunshot wounds have entrances that are located either in the 
head, in the chest, over the heart region, or in the abdomen. 
The location for the entrance wound occurring over the 
clavicle is an atypical location for an entrance wound. Also 
in suicides the wounds are typically contact wounds or close 
contact, meaning the end of the barrel is close to the surface 
of the body when the weapon is discharged. 
A possibility in this case is that the deceased, if 
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she was indeed the one firing the weapon, could have flinched 
and accounted for the misplacement of the entrance wound. 
However, typically if individuals flinch, the weapon has been 
placed in a close contact or contact position and then rotated 
and produces tangential wounds on the skin surface. Usually 
someone does not flinch outwords before firing a weapon. 
Also the angle of fire, most of the suicide entrance 
wounds are usually straight on, maybe a slight angle. But the 
fact that there is an intermediate range with stippling makes 
it very unusual for this to be a self-inflicted wound. Based 
on the investigation, we had no information that she had any 
previous suicidal thoughts, although that in several of our 
suicide cases that we have at our office we may not have 
information that specifically says that this person was 
suicidal. 
The other thing is the elevation of the clavicle. 
If someone is to shoot themselves, I would find it very 
unusual that they would elevate their arm as they're doing 
this procedure, unless an individual is lying down and 
possibly placing the hand behind the head in a resting 
position. And also the information that I obtained as far as 
the results of the gunshot residue testing that we had of the 
samples that we had obtained on the deceased, as well as other 
gunshot residue tests that were done. 
Q All right. Dr. Leis, did you actually measure the 
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length of Mary's arms? 
A It was 26 and-a-half centimeters in length — excuse 
me, 26 and-a-half inches in length, 
Q All right. And based upon the length of her arms, 
the stippling and your observations and testing of the gun, 
how probable is it that she shot herself? 
A It is unlikely. What we — to reproduce these 
results, we have a range minimum of nine inches from which the 
end of the barrel was with respect to her skin. The length 
from the end of the barreling to the trigger is an additional 
5 inches, which would make 14 inches. I don't remember the 
date when — I don't recall the date, but Vern Peterson was 
had the his office, we used his own weapon, police issue 
weapon and we had a secretary with an arm length of 28 inches, 
we had her use — we measured the nine inches. She used his 
weapon, which, as I recall, was roughly four inches from the 
end of the barrel to the trigger and with an arm length of 2 8 
inches, she was unable to reach, put her hand around the 
trigger and reporduce the angle as well. 
MS. HORNACK: All right. I have no other questions. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Remal, you may 
cross-examine. 
MS. REMAL: Thank you. Your Honor. 
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CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MS. REMAL: 
Q Dr. Leis, you don't have too much experience in 
doing test firings, do you? 
A These — the two that I mentioned with Rudy were the 
only two that I have personally been involved with the actual 
procedure of test firing. 
Q And you have to admit that these are approximate 
range determinations, you have to give or take an inch or two 
in either direction? 
A I would say no based on the reproducibility of the 
results. We have two different measurements, one from the 
crime lab and also from our own testing. In comparison of the 
distance with the target as compared to the actual 
measurements that I got on the deceased, I think they were 
reproducible enough. 
Q When you measured on either the victim herself or on 
the test firings that you did, you measured the diameter of 
the gunshot residue, you don't measure every single little 
spec of — excuse me, not residue, but of stippling. You 
don't measure every single spec, there are some stray specs, 
for instance, that may be out of the dense part of the 
stippling; is that right? 
A That's correct* 
Q And Mary Barndt had freckles on her body, didn't 
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she? 
A That's correct. 
Q And there was some difficulty, was there not, in 
determining exactly which things you were looking at were 
freckles and which were evidence is stippling; is that right? 
A In a distant inspection, yes, the difference between 
the two was difficult. However, in using both close vision as 
well as a magnifying lense, it was — I was able to make the 
determination as to what is a freckle versus a stippling 
pattern, because a stippling not only is a result of burning 
and contact, there was also a slight depression and the 
coloration, which granted is similar to the freckles, also is 
the result of tissue reaction due to penetration of the 
surface of the skin. 
Q Now, the surface that you did the test firings on to 
was paper? 
A Correct. 
Q And was if attached to something like cardboard or 
anything like that? 
A We taped it to a sheet of cardboard which was in 
front of computer paper which we used to trap the bullet. 
Q And this was done at the medical examiner's office 
or in some other location? 
A Correct, the medical examiner's office. 
Q Right at the office. Now, you've indicated that 
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it's your understanding that sometimes pig skin is used in 
order to do these types of test firings; is that right? 
A Correct. 
Q And isn't that because pig skin is considered to be 
more similar to human skin than, for instance, paper? 
A That is the closest acceptable tissue that can be 
used. 
Q Now, you've indicated that you at some date after 
doing the test firings had your secretary with the 28-inch arm 
try and reproduce what you thought might have happened; is 
that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q Or one version of what might have happened? 
A That's correct. 
Q And her arms, I think you said, were 28 inches? 
A Yes. 
Q And victim's arms were 26 and-a-half inches; is that 
right? 
A Correct. 
Q And it sounded like you used Vern Peterson's own 
weapon rather than the particular weapon used in this case. 
Exhibit No. 3; is that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q The — if I understood you correctly, what you asked 
the secretary to do was to hold the weapon in a position in a 
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regular holding — Your Honor, perhaps I can demonstrate, I'm 
having trouble spitting out the words, 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MS. REMAL: Somebody has looked to make sure this 
isn't loaded, haven't they? 
THE COURT: Let's look again just to make sure. 
MS. REMAL: I'm sure, but — 
THE COURT: Pull it out. I'd just leave it out. Is 
there a safety on that? 
Q (BY MS. REMAL) Did you ask the secretary to hold 
the weapon in the position that I'm holding it now and then 
try and turn it around this way? 
A That's correct. 
Q So you asked her to hold it in the regular position 
with her index finger on the trigger? 
A Correct. 
Q Now, if a person were holding it as I'm doing now, 
with their thumb on the trigger, you could get the weapon 
farther away from your body, couldn't you? 
A Correct. 
Q All right. Now, you've indicated that the path of 
the projectile was right to left, slightly, and somewhat 
upward; is that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q And that would mean that whoever was holding the 
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weapon would have had to have been holding it lower than the 
clavicle area where the wound was inflicted; is that right? 
A That's correct* 
Q And, in fact, it appears from Exhibit 6, I think it 
is, the mannequin, which we've referred to previously, that 
this little rod that is here, is that supposed to reflect the 
approximate angle as best you could figure it? 
A That's correct. 
Q And so the weapon would have had to have been held 
somewhere down in the breast area, is that about right? 
A That's correct, to the right of her midline and 
below her right breast. 
Q Okay. Now, you've indicated that in regards to the 
elevation of the left arm, or elbow, that you're not sure 
exactly what position the arm would have been in, only that 
the elbow would hav had to have been elevated to about the 
shoulder level; is that right? 
A That's correct, the actual position of the hand, 
whether it's in front of the face or behind the head can 
determine — 
Q So what her forearm and hand were doing are unknown 
to you? 
A Right. 
Q Now, you've indicated that when you received the 
victim's body, there was obviously medical equipment attached, 
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as if medical treatment had already taken place; is that 
right? 
A That's correct. 
Q And was it your understanding that she was indeed 
worked on by paramedics prior to arriving at your office? 
A Yes, the presence of a chest tube and a thoracotomy 
incision would indicate that, 
Q When you received the body, were there bags still on 
the hands, either of the hands or not? 
A The hands were not bagged* 
Q And you took a gunshot residue test at the medical 
examiner's office? is that right, or a sample? 
A I personally did not. The autopsy assistant at that 
time under my supervision actually took the four samples. 
Q And do you know what happened to those samples? 
A Those samples were given to the police officer that 
was present at the time of the autopsy as evidence. It was 
given to Sergeant Clint Hodgkinson. 
Q Now, you indicated that one of the first things that 
you do as a part of your natural or regular procedure is to 
take photographs of the body? is that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q And did you that, indeed, in this case, didn't you? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you take photographs of the hands as well as 
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other parts of the body? 
A Yes, I did. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, may I approach the witness? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MS. REMAL: I guess I should approach your clerk and 
have her mark this. 
Q (BY MS. REMAL) Dr. Leis, showing you what's now 
been marked as separate exhibits. Defendant's Exhibits Nos. 1, 
2, 3, and 4, I'd ask you to take a moment to look at those. 
A Okay. 
Q Are those among the photographs that were taken at 
the medical examiner's office of this particular person? 
A Yes, they're front and back photographs of both the 
right and left hand with our autopsy case number on the 
measurement. 
Q And would those have been taken — would that have 
been one of the first things that you did prior to doing the 
external and internal examinaitons? 
A Correct. 
Q And on each of the photographs it shows the presence 
of blood on the hands, does it not. 
A Yes. 
MS REMAL: Your Honor, I would move to admit 
Exhibits 1 through 4, Defendant's Exhibits 1 through 4. 
MS. HORNACK: No objection. 
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THE COURT: Defendant's Exhibits 1 through 4 are 
admitted. 
Q (BY MS. REMAL) Just hang on to those for a minute. 
As part of the autopsy process, bodily fluids are taken from 
the victim; is that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q And then subsequent toxicology reports are done on 
those fluids; is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q And that was done in this case; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And there was in that toxicology examination 
indications of the presence of alcohol; is that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q I'd ask — you have a copy of the report, do you 
not? 
A Yes. 
Q I'd ask you to refer to that toxicology report and 
tell us what amounts of blood and vitreous alcohol was found 
in the victim? 
A The blood alcohol level was 0.10, which would be 
slightly above the State legal limit for intoxication. 
Q And what about the vitreous level? 
A The vitreous is slightly higher, it's 0.14. 
However, vitreous fluid contains more water than blood does 
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and so we use a conversion factor. The actual level of 
alcohol in vitreous is slightly lower than that and with the 
conversion factor, the alcohol level in the vitreous fluid 
from the eye would 0.12. 
Q And can you describe to us what the difference is, 
just where those samples come from and what those different 
levels mean? 
A We use the comparison of blood alcohol with vitreous 
alcohol to get a determination as to whether the person is 
acutely intoxicated or has just recently completed consuming 
alcohol as opposed to whether they have consumed alcohol a 
period of time before and are now sobering up. Usually what 
happens is after you take a drink your blood level is going to 
be higher than the vitreous fluid in the eye and then after a 
period of time the alcohol is equilibrated among all the 
fluids of the body and so the vitreous fluid and the alcohol 
level will be somewhat similar. As a person stops drinking 
and begins sobering up, the alcohol level will decrease faster 
and the vitreous fluid level will stay a little bit higher. 
Q And now one of the effects of the consumption of 
alcohol is that it very often affects the judgment of the 
person consuming the alcohol; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And it will also very often affect the coordination 
of the person who has consumed the alcohol? is that right? 
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A Yes. 
Q You also you did what you call a drug screen; is 
that true, as part of the toxicology report? 
A Yes. 
Q And what did you find as a result of that? 
A The only drugs that were found were Diazapam which 
his Valium and a metabolite of Diazapam. 
Q And what does that mean the metabolite of Diazapam? 
A It means after you consume a drug the body goes to 
breakdown this drug into different components which are easier 
for the body to release. 
Q Have you made a comparison between the normal 
theraeputic dosage of Valium as compared to the amount that 
you found in this particular case? 
A The information I was able to find on Valium is that 
studies have shown that if an individual has not previously 
taken Valium and takes one 10 milligram pillf their peak blood 
level, the highest level that is obtained usually occurs one 
hour after this pill is taken and its level is .14. Hers was 
.33, which could mean that she took a higher quantity. Now 
studies have also shown that in people chronically using the 
drug, meaning they take the same amount of drug day after day 
after day, after a period of time the level tapers off and 
comes to a steady state where the level is pretty much 
reproducible day after day. Those were done in individuals 
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who took 30 milligrams of Diazapam per day and those levels 
reach a steady state or pretty much level off at 1.03. So 
she's in that range, she's closer to the single oral dosage 
range. 
Q And in your opinion, what would be the effect of the 
combined use of the amount of alcohol that you see here and 
the amount of Valium that see here? 
A Well, Valium is used as a — can be used as a 
sleeping medication, for antianxiety, it helps someone rest 
and it's also used in treatment of seizure disorders, but its 
effects are on the center nervous systwm in that it will make 
people tired, drowsy, slow them down. Their effects of pretty 
much similar as to alcohol and both of these drugs would 
produce the same effects and would heighten each others 
effect. 
Q Now, you've indicated that one of the things that 
you were — a couple of factors that you took into 
consideration in coming to the conclusion that the manner of 
death was homicide rather than suicide was the nature of the 
wound itself and the location of the wound; is that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q Now, you indicated that it seemed like your thought 
processes were trying to make a decision between homicide and 
suicide? is that — 
A That's correct. 
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Q Those are the two things that you considered? 
A That's correct* 
Q If the wound were an accidental wound, is that 
something that you considered at all? 
A Not necessarily. 
Q If you learned that the particular weapon had what's 
been described as on the margin of a hair trigger, would that 
effect your decision at all about the particular case that 
we're talking about? 
A No, simply because of the distance and the 
positioning of the entrance wound. It still favors that the 
projectile — or the weapon is held a distance away from the 
body, and from the measurements that I've obtained, would be 
unlikely that the deceased is the one who actually pulled the 
trigger. 
Q You have previously seen stippling in the process of 
doing autopsies; is that not correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And you've seen it, I think, in two other occasions; 
is that right? 
A I've seen it on more than two occasions. 
Q All right. You've seen it on two occasions however 
when there were witnesses which confirmed that they were 
suicides; is that right? 
A That's correct. 
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Q And so what that tells you is that there have at 
least been two other suicides that you've been involved in 
that were not contact wounds as well; is that right? 
A That's correct* 
MS, REMAL: Your Honor, may I have one moment? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q (BY MS. REAML) Did you have any information from 
either police officers or a witness named Judy Clark at the 
time that you made a determination of the manner of death? 
A The information that I got usually was the result -
as part of the investigation was from Vern Peterson. 
Q And did he give you any information about comments 
by the mother of the victim, Judy Clark? 
A None that I recall. 
MS. REMAL: Okay. I don't have anything further, 
Your Honor, of this witness. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. HORNACK: I just have one question. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. HORNACK: 
Q Dr. Leis, would it make any difference in your 
opinion whether or not the gun was held and fired with the 
index finger or the thumb, would that change your opinion? 
A All I could say on that is if the index finger is 
used in the trigger, on the trigger, she would not have been 
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able to produce that angle and that range of fire* If she had 
used her thumb, it is possible that she could have been the 
one that fired the weapon. 
Q Okay. Even if the thumb had been used, would that 
change your opinion as to whether it was a suicide or a 
homicide? 
A As I stated before, the actual findings from the 
autopsy made me favor a homicide over a suicide. The initial 
information based on the gunshot residue test results also 
were included as a factor in making my final determination. 
MS. HORNACK: Thank you. 
MS. REMAL: I don't have anything further, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. You may step down. 
MS. HORNACK: Your Honor, can he be excused? 
MS. REMAL: I don't any objection to that. 
THE COURT: You may be excused, thank you. Doctor. 
And the exhibits you can just leave them with me here. How 
many other witnesses are you going to call 
MR. JONES: We have two more witnesses to call. 
THE COURT: Perhpas now would be a good time to take 
a break. The Court will be in recess for approximately five 
minutes. Thank you. 
(A brief recess.) 
THE COURT: Call your next witness, please. 
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Q Do you know the kind of things he works with, the 
kinds of materials, the kinds of elements? 
A Metal, oil, whatever it takes around — 
Q Auto type stuff? 
A Yes. 
MR. MAURO: No further questions. 
MR. JONES: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Thank you for your testimony. You may 
step down. 
MR. JONES: I think Mr. Smith has been sworn? 
THE WITNESS: No, I've not. 
KEVIN SMITH, 
called as a witness, being first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q Would you state your name, please. 
A My name is Kevin Smith. 
Q And, Mr. Smith, what is your occupation? 
A I'm employed by the State of Utah as a criminalist. 
0 All right. And as a criminalist, what is your 
assignment or duty? 
A I'm currently assigned to the firearms and tool 
marks section. 
Q All right. Let me show you what has been marked as 
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Exhibits 4 and 5. Do you recognize these two exhibits? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q And what is Exhibit 4? 
A Exhibit 4 is a gunshot residue kit that was 
submitted on a subject by the name of Mary Barndt. 
Q What was the date that you received that? 
A I believe it was received in the laboratory on the 
22nd of August. 
Q Okay. And how about Exhibit 5? 
A It was also a GSR kit that was received into the 
laboratory on a Donald Jaeger, J-a-e-g-e-r. 
Q Did you have a chance to do any testing on those two 
samples? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And what kind of testing did you do? 
A I performed an analysis called scanning electron 
microscopy in conjunction with an electron — excuse me, an 
x-ray analyzer. 
Q All right. And what else was involved, anything 
else besides — 
A Well, that's the instrumentation that is used to 
analyze GSR kits. 
Q What is the purpose of that test? 
A It determines whether or not gunshot residue is 
present on a sample. 
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1 Q With reference to Exhibit 4 involving Mary Brandt, 
2 what did you find with that test? 
3 A I found that gunshot residue was not detected on 
4 those samples. 
5 Q And how about Exhibit 5, the test involving the 
6 defendant, Donald Jaeger? 
7 A Particles characteristic of gunshot residue were 
8 detected on Exhibit No. 5. 
9 MR. JONES: I would offer Exhibits 4 and 5, Your 
10 Honor. 
11 M S . REMAL: May I cross-examine first, Your Honor, 
12 before you rule on that? 
13 THE COURT: You may. 
14 MR. JONES: That's all the questions T have. 
15 CROSS-EXAMINAITON 
16 BY MS. REMAL: 
17 0 Mr. Smith, what is it you look for with • scanning 
18 electron microscope in making a determination whether 
19 something is or isn't gunshot residue or is consistent with 
20 gunshot residue? 
21 A I'm looking for spherical particles that contain 
22 lead along with other elements. Among these elements are 
23 barium and antimony. There are other elements that can be 
24 present. If both antimony and barium are present in the same 
25 particle, regardless of whether or not lead is there, it's 
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considered to be gunshot residue. 
Q And what is it that you would describe as consistent 
with gunshot residue as opposed to unique to gunshot residue? 
A A spherical particle that contained lead and barium 
or antimony, not both; or a particle that contained barium or 
a particle that contained antimony along with a limited number 
of other elements that could be present, 
Q So the difference between something that's 
consistent with gunshot residue and something that is gunshot 
residue is whether or not those three elements; lead, antimony 
and barium are altogether within the same spherical particle, 
is that — 
A Generally speak, that's the case. 
Q And what you found in reference to Exhibit No. 5, 
which is the one referring to Mr. Jaegar's sample, was 
consistent with gunshot residue; is that right? 
A Well, I believe my report reads characteristic. 
Q And characteristic means that you didn't find all 
three elements; lead, antimony and barium in any of the same 
spherical particles; is that right? 
A That is correct. 
Q Were there two — there were four separate little 
disks that were submitted for analysis; is that right, in each 
of the gunshot residue kits that you received? 
A That's correct. 
JODY EDWARDS — CAPITOL REPORTERS 
92 
Q And in reference to Exhibit No. 5, that identified 
as coming from Mr. Jaeger, did you examine all of the disks A, 
B, just some of them? 
A The general laboratory procedure is to analyze only 
the disks marked as A and C. 
Q And did you do that in this case? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q With reference to Mr. Jaeger's sample? 
A Yes. 
Q And did you find particles characteristic of gunshot 
residue on both A and C, or just A or C? 
A Both A and C. 
Q And that would indicate that apparently gunshot 
residue was — or particles consistent or characteristic with 
gunshot residue were found on both of Mr, Jaeger's hands; is 
that a fair interpretation of that? 
A Particles characteristic of gunshot residue were 
found on both hands. 
Q Were you also asked to look at a sample that was 
marked dry fire that you received from Vern Peterson of the 
West Jordan Police Department? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q And did you dm a scanning electron microscopic 
analyses of that sample? 
A Yes, I did. 
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Q And did you find anything that was consistent with 
or unique to a gunshot residue in that sample? 
A I found one particle that was unique and a limited 
number of particles that were characteristic ever gunshot 
residue. 
Q And that was from the sample marked dry fire? 
A That's correct. 
Q Now, you've indicated that you also received and 
analyzed Exhibit No. 4 which has been marked as a gunshot 
residue sample coming from Mary Barndt? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And what you indicated your analysis of that 
disclosed was that gunshot residue was not detected; isn't 
that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q When you're looking at a sample that you eventually 
decide as a negative for gunshot residue, how long do you look 
at it before you come up with that opinion? 
A We scan four rows, and quite honestly, I'm not 
certain what percentage of the total area of the that disk is. 
That's the normal procedure is that it's a certain amount of 
area, not a certain amount of time. 
Q Do you recall in this case approximately how long 
that took you? 
A No, I do not. I do not recall. 
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1 In any case, you didn't look at every single 
2 particle that came from the Mary Barndt sample; is that right? 
3 I did not cover the entire stub, no. 
4 And, in fact, it's not your policy, it's not the 
5 crime lab's policy to look at every single particle? 
6 A To look at the entire stub, that's correct. 
7 Q If, in other words, there was a particle or were 
8 particles that were consistent with or unique to gunshot 
9 residue on some part you didn't look at on that Exhibit No. 4 
10 sample, you wouldn't have seen it, would that be a fair 
11 statement? 
12 A That's possible, yes. 
13 C You have been employed at the state crime lab as a 
14 criminalist for how long? 
15 Seven and-a-half years. 
16 Q And how many previous gunshot residue samples have 
17 you looked at with the electron, the scanning electron 
18 microscope, approximately? 
19 ft Boy, I would guess between 300 and 500 kits, which 
20 would mean between 600 and 1,000 samples, I'm not certain. 
21 Q lii an\ case, in the hundreds you've looked at? 
22 * 1 es 
23
 w And have any of those samples come from persons that 
24 were eventually ruled to be suicide victims? 
25 I don't know. We receive samples that are submitted 
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as coming from suicide victims, I never know the final outcome 
of the investigation that the OME performs. 
Q All right. The lack of finding gunshot residue by 
itself shouldn't be conclusive, should it, in making a 
decision whether a person has fired a gun? 
A In my opinion it should not be. 
Q And why is that? 
A It's possible to have fired a gun and for various 
reasons the residue would not be present. 
Q And what are those various reasons? 
A Rifles will oftentime — well, oftentimes will more 
seldomly leave gunshot residue, passage of time, if you wash 
your hands, a number of reasons. 
Q It could be wiped off, can it not, gunshot residue? 
A Yes. 
Q In fact, the kit, the instructions on the kit 
instruct you not to bother taking the sample if more than four 
hours has passed since the shooting of the weapon; is that 
right? 
A That's correct. 
Q And that's because the passage of time just by 
itself — 
A Well, excuse me, that's not an active subject, the 
four hours. 
Q The passage of time and movement by the shooter of a 
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1 gun will cause gunshot residue to disappear in some cases; is 
2 that right? 
3 A That's correct. 
4 Q If a person after shooting a gun should wipe their 
5 hands on clothes or place their hands in pockets, that's one 
6 possible way gunshot residue could disappear is it not? 
7 Those things could remove some gunshot residue from 
8 hands, y e s . 
9 Q Were any paper sacks or paper bags ever submitted to 
10 you for any sort of analysis? 
11 A Yes, I believe there were some paper sacks 
12 submitted. 
13 _ And do you recall whether any analysis was ever done 
14 of those? 
15 A Some paper sacks containing clothing were brought in 
16 and — 
17 Q Were,' there*? any paper sacks that were submitted 
18 having been identified as sacks that had covered the hands of 
19 Mary Barndt prior to the taking of gunshot residue samples? 
20 A Not that wei e given to me. 
21 Q Okay. Are you aware of there being other sources of 
22 the element of lead other than from gunshot residue? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q What other sources could there possibly be? 
25 A Gasoline contains lead, people that work on 
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1 automobiles could have lead on their hands, led smelters, 
2 those stun guns. 
3
 Q A r e Y°u aware of sources besides gunshot residue for 
4 the element of antimony? 
5 A N o t
 specifically, although it may be present in some 
6 of the ones I just listed, stun guns, for instance. 
7 Q And how about the element of barium, what other 
8 possible sources are there for that? 
9 A Well, barium sulfide is a common element, it's used 
10 in lots of different procedures* 
11 Q Can you give us some examples? 
12 A Oh, I believe it could be used as a — the term is 
13 not coming to my mind, something to give color to a — it's a 
14 source of color of some kinds. I believe it can be used as a 
15 thickener in some ways, although I'm not certain how that 
16 would be used. 
17 M S . REMAL: Your Honor, may I have just one moment? 
18 THE COURT: You may. 
19 M S . REMAL: Thank you. No further questions. Your 
20 Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Jones? 
22 I MR. JONES: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Thank you for your testimony. 
24 I THE WITNESS: May I be excused, Your Honor? 
25 M S . REMAL: No objection. 
23 
ADDENDUM C 
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THE COURT: You may be excused, 
MR. JONES: I do have one other witness. 
THE COURT: Call your witness. 
JAMES GASKILL, 
called a ltness, being PREVIOUSLY duly swornf was examined 
and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JONES: 
Would you state your name, please. 
My name is James Gaskillf G-a-s-k-i-1-1. 
Q And, Jim, what is your occupation? 
I'm an assistant professor and director of the crime 
laboratory at Weber State University. 
Q And as such, what do you do at the crime lab? 
? We accept evidence from criminal justice agencies 
and analyze that evidence and make conclusions and testify, if 
necessary. 
Q All right. Did you have a chance to receive what's 
beer marked here as State's Exhibit No. 3f this firearm? 
1 es, sir. 
Do you recall when you received that? 
A Initially on the 10th of October of 1990. 
Q And who brought that to you? 
A Vern Peterson from the West Jordan Police 
Department. 
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Q Did you have a chance to do any testing with the gun 
itself? 
A Yes. 
Q And can you just outline for us the type of testing 
you did? 
A We first of all just tested the trigger pullmgs, 
just to determine that the gun was a normally functioning 
weapon. 
Q What was the trigger pull on this gun? 
A Approximately two pounds. 
Q Would you say that it had a hair trigger? 
A That's pretty close to a hair trigger. That is a 
pretty light pull. 
Q The two pounds? 
A Two pounds. 
Q What else did you do? 
A We attempted to determine the level of gunshot 
residue that would come on the hands of a shooter if he were 
to fire this weapon and also the likelihood of finding gunshot 
residue if the weapon were dry fired, that is just fired 
without any ammunition into it. 
Q All right. How many times did you actually fire the 
gun with ammunition? 
A I'm not sure actually how many times we did fire 
this weapon all told. Probably in excess of 10 or 12 times. 
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Q Ail right. And in each of those, did you try to 
determine whether or not there was evidence of gunshot residue 
on the person who was firing the gun? 
A No. 
Q You didn't do that? 
A Not every — no, there were a couple of other things 
we did in addition to the gunshot residue. We fired it also 
to determine which way the cartridges go, eject when the gun 
is £11red. So we didn't every time do gunshot residue 
analysis, but sometimes we did. 
Q Can you give the court an idea of how many times you 
did the gunshot residue analysis when you did fire the gun. 
A I think we took two kits, two gunshot residue kits. 
Q And what did you find? 
A We found that when you fired this weapon normally, 
that you have no trouble finding gunshot residue on the hand 
of the shooter in the tests that we conducted. 
O Was the gunsho" reduce on both hands or just one 
hand, do you recall? 
A We fired it with one hand and we got residue on one 
hand. 
Q Do you remember which hand you used? 
A Right hand. 
Q And so you got the residue ; the righ hand? 
That's correct. 
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1 Q You also mentioned that one of the tests you 
2 conducted was on dry firing the gun? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q What does that mean? 
5 A It just means that you pull the trigger and there's 
6 no ammunition in it and the action, that is the firing pin 
7 comes forward and makes a click and then you can open the 
8 action and cock it and do that again. So we just fired it 
9 with no ammunition in it, just clicked it a few times. 
10 Q All right. What happened when you dry fired the 
11 gun? 
12 A We took a gunshot residue test from that and found 
13 no evidence of gunshot residue in the dry firing that we 
14 conducted. 
15 Q How many times would you have done the dry fire, do 
16 you recall? 
17 A We took two kits, we only tested one of them, but we 
18 did dry fire it several times for that kit. In other words, 
19 we clicked it several times and then took a test and examined 
20 that and found no residue. 
21 Q From a dry fire? 
22 A That's correct. 
23 MR. JONES: I think that's all the questions I have. 
24 THE COURT: Thank you. You may cross-examine. 
25 MS. REMAL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MS. REMAL: 
Q Mr* Gaskill, the trigger pull test that you did 
resulted in showing that the trigger pull was about two 
pounds? is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q And you said that's pretty close to a hair trigger? 
A Yes. 
Q And what do you mean by hair trigger? 
A Well, that's not — that's not a very scientific 
term, it just means that it's a very light trigger, very easy 
to pull the trigger. 
^ You mean it doesn't take very much pressui
 rull 
the trigger? 
A That's correct, it takes about two pounds. 
Now, you indicated that you did gunshot residue 
testing after having yourself or some other person at your lab 
fire the pai ticular gun, Exhibit No. 3; is that right? 
Yes, it was, in fact, another member of the lab that 
did the firings and I took the tests, I took the samples and I 
was present at the time. 
And did you analyze the samples that you took in the 
lab? 
A Yes. Well, there were two other people thex . out I 
did it, yes. 
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Q And was that using the scanning electron microscope 
method? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q And you've indicated that with those two — well, 
let me ask you this first. Did you analyze both of those two 
GSR kits after doing the test firings in your lab? 
A Excuse me, both of which two? 
Q Let me start again. You indicated you shot the gun 
about 10 or 12 times altogether in the various testing that 
you did? 
A Yes, maybe even a few more than that. 
Q And of those 10 or 12 firings, after firing the gun, 
you took gunshot residue samples from the shooter's hands? 
A Can I clarify? 
Q Sure. 
A Okay. There were things that we were asked to 
determine. One of those things that we wanted to determine 
was whether when you fire this weapon you get gunshot residue, 
recognizable gunshot residue on the hands. So I had a member 
of the staff wash his hands, he test fired the weapon, I took 
the kit, okay? We did that twice, of those we only tested 
one. 
Q All right, that's my question. Let's stop here. 
A Okay. 
Q On that one test, the gunshot residue sample that 
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you took from that employee of the lab, you used the electron 
scanning or the scanning electron microscope method to examine 
that? 
A Yes. 
Q You indicated that what you found was that there was 
gunshot residue on that sample; is that right? 
A That's right. 
Q Describe to us what you mean by that. What do you 
mean gunshot residue that you found on that sample? 
A Well, we found particles in that scanning electron 
examination on the screen had the characteristic appearance of 
gunshot particles, and when analyzed with the x-ray analyzer 
of the scanning electron microscope, had the elements that we 
considered to be consistent with gunshot residue, and we call 
that a positive gunshot residue test. 
Q And those elements would be lead, antimony and 
barium; is that right? 
A Correct. 
Q And in order to feel comfortable that it's gunshot 
residue, they would have to be a spherical particle; is that 
right? 
A Correct. 
Q And you would need to find all three of those 
together before you could feel confident in saying this is 
gunshot residue or not something else? 
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A Well, not exactly necessary to find all three, at 
least two. 
Q But in this case you did find particles of that test 
fire that you analyzed that did have all three, lead, antimony 
and barium in the same particle? 
A That's correct. 
Q Now, you indicated that you did a dry fire test 
also; is that right? 
A Yes, ma'am. 
Q And you've described that to us, you basically 
pulled the trigger without any ammunition in the gun? 
A Right. 
Q Does that mean that there wasn't a clip in the gun 
at all or that there was a clip in the gun, but that there was 
no bullet in the chamber in the firing position? 
A It means that there was no clip or cartridge. 
Q It's possible, is it not, with the kind of gun that 
Exhibit No. 3 is to have a clip in the gun itself, but no 
bullet available in the firing position in the chamber? 
A That's correct. 
Q And would that particular gun, Exhibit No. 3, in 
order to get a bullet into firing position, you would need to 
pull the slide back and then let it go back into position; is 
that right? 
A If the clip is in, that's right. If the clip is not 
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in, you can still manually place one cartridge in the chamber 
and close it, but the normal operation is that you have 
ammunition in the clip, you put the clip in ans you pull the 
slide back, release it and that slides a cartridge up into the 
chamber and it's ready to fire* 
Q If there is a clip in the gun, but you don't pull 
the slide back, you pull the trigger without pulling the slide 
back first, there wouldn't be any bullet available to be fired 
out of the gun; is that right? 
A Well, that's — assuming that there isn't one in 
there? 
Q Uh-huh. 
A And there could be one in there, but if you have an 
empty gun and you put ammunition in the clip, you put the clip 
in the gun, then you have to pull the slide back and release 
it. If you don't do that, then you don't have a round in the 
chamber and it won't fire* 
Q How long have you worked in the crime lab capacity 
that you're in now? 
A About 20 years. 
Q And you have — have you worked with gunshot residue 
on previous occasions? 
A Yes. 
Q Can you give us any sort of ballpark guess as to how 
many times you have analyzed gunshot residue? 
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A More than 100. 
Q Isn't it correct that if — let me pose a 
hypothetical for you. If someone is wounded with a gunshot 
wound and if that wound has stippling around it and if another 
person touches that wound, that other person would have 
gunshot residue on their hand if they touched the stippling, 
would they not? 
A Well, that's possible. 
Q Possible. Gunshot residue itself can be transferred 
from one place to another, can it not? 
A Yes. 
Q It could be transferred, for instance, from a hand 
to a peice of clothing if you rubbed it on clothing? 
A Sure, sure. 
Q If you put your hands in pockets, it could be rubbed 
on the pockets? 
A Yes. 
Q It could be transferred from one person to another 
if the part of the body, presumably the hands with the gunshot 
residue, touched another person, would that be right? 
A Yeah. Can I elaborate just a little bit? 
Q Well, why don't you answer that first and then 
we'll ~ 
A The answer yes. 
Q Okay. If I shot a gun and I had gunshot residue on 
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1 iny hand from shooting the gun and then I went shook hands with 
2 you immediately afterwards, it would be possible for the 
3 gunshot residue to then be transferred onto your hand, 
4 wouldn't it? 
5 A It would be possible. 
6 Q You've — have you testified fired other guns in 
7 your previously cases you've worked on? 
8 A Oh, yes. 
9 Q How many times, any idea? 
10 A Lots and lots. I haven't kept track of numbers, but 
11 lots of times. 
12 Q In comparing this gun that we're talking about here, 
13 Exhibit No. 3, with guns that you've test fired for whatever 
14 various reasons in the past, this gun is a fairly clean gun, 
15 isn't it, in terms of not exuding a great deal of gunshot 
16 residue? 
17 A I'd characterize it as that, y e s . 
18 Q And what I mean by "clean gun" is there aren't huge 
19 clouds of gunshot residue and powder coming out of the gun? 
20 A Well, that's a relative thing, but certainly this 
21 one doesn't exude as much as a lot of them that I've seen. 
22 Q And, in fact, in general terms, and I understand 
23 there's certainly exceptions, this kind of gun, a 
24 semiautomatic, would tend to have less gunshot residue come 
25 out of it than a revolver, would that be a fare statement? 
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A I don't know if I would say that, I've never done 
any studies to indicate that. In a revolveer you have more 
openings, but certainly this action opens as soon as it's 
fired, And so you do have a very large opening in the 
semiautomatic, and so I — I don't know, it's a .22 and 
therefore there's less gunshot residue than there would be in 
a larger caliber. 
Q Now, you indicated to us that one of the tests you 
did or one of the tests you were asked to do was to try and 
detennine where a cartridge, an empty shell would be ejected 
to after the gun was fired, is that one the things you did? 
A Yes. 
Q And how did you go about doing that? 
A Fired it and measured where the cartridge case 
landed. 
Q And how many times did you do that, how many of 
those tests did you do? 
A Six or seven different time we fired that for that 
purpose. 
Q And what did you find out in terms of where the 
cartridge went? 
A In holding the weapon facing forward, the cartridge 
case goes to the right almost perpendicularly and lands 
somewhere 87 to 111 inches ion the firing, so there may be 
greater variations of that, but somewhere in that vicinity 
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seven, eight, nine feet to the right. 
Q Where did you get the ammunition that you used to do 
the test firings that you did in this particular case? 
A Prom Vern Peterson. 
Q And do you recall or do you have in your notes any 
where what type of ammunition, what brand that was? 
A Yes, it was Winchester Super X. 
Q And do you recall if that was the same ammunition 
that you got from Sergeant Peterson or did you simply try and 
match it if there wasn't enough? 
A Well, we had to get some additional beyond what he 
gave us and we — 
Q And you just matched the very same thing? 
A That's correct. But he did supply us with some. Of 
course, I have no way of knowing personally whether that's the 
same kind, but he indicated to me that it's the same 
ammunition. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, may I have just one moment? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MS. REMAL: I don't have anything further, Your 
Honor. Thank you. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q Just one other line of questioning. You were asked 
by defense counsel on cross-examination if she fired the gun 
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and got gunshot residue on her hands and then shook hands with 
you would it transfer the gun shot residue to you and I think 
you said there was something you wanted to explain about that. 
A Two things. Of course, when we do the test, we're 
pretty specific about where we take the sample, for that very 
reason. In other words, gunshot residue on the palm of the 
hand doesn't mean the same thing as gunshot residue on the 
back of the hands. 
And the second thing, I think I just wanted to 
explain that we're not talking about large quantities. These 
are very minute quantities of gunshot residue that we're 
dealing with, so that it, you know, if you were to rub it on 
your clothing, the likelihood of finding it on your clothing, 
for example, would be very low, and so therefore the 
likelihood of transferring it and finding it on something else 
would be very low. I just wanted to clarify that we weren't 
talking about large quantity. 
Q If someone were to fire the gun, Exhibit 3 in this 
case, would you expect to find absolutely no gunshot residue 
on their hands? 
A If a person fires this gun and the residue doesn't 
get nabbed off, I would expect to find it. 
MR. JONES: All right. I think that's all I have. 
Thank you. 
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RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MS. REMAL: 
Q And would activity by the shooter be one of the ways 
that the residue could be wiped off? 
A Yeah# there's an infinite number of ways. You can 
wash your hands* 
Q In fact, even just the passage of time and movement 
without washing or rubbing hands specifically could make 
gunshot residue disappear; isn't that right? 
A I've never seen any study that indicates the gunshot 
residue would all by itself just leave over a period of time. 
It isn't something that is going to easily decompose, so if 
you have it and it's undisturbed, then it should stay there 
for a long, long, long time, years. 
Q But if there's movement, as you said we're talking 
about minute quantities to start with, it could disappear by 
being touched by something else or being rubbed on something, 
couldn't it? 
A It could. 
MS. REMAL: I don't have anything further, Your 
Honor• 
THE COURT: Mr. Jones? Thank you, you may step 
down. Is there any other witness or evidence for the State? 
MR. JONES: No, Your Honor, the State would rest. 
We do have these Exhibits 1 and 2 I think here at the desk. 
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Eule 7. Proceedings oeiore magistrate. 
U) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant 
shall appear before the court as directed in the summons. 
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with or without 
* warrant, the person arrested shall be taken to a magistrate. If a magistrate 
a not available in the circuit or precinct, the person arrested shall be taken to 
the nearest available magistrate for aetting of bail. If an information has not 
been filed, one shall be filed without delay before the magistrate having juris-
diction ever the offense. 
(c) (1) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was 
committed be shall without unnecessary delay be returned to the county 
where the crime was committed and shall be taken before the proper 
magistrate under these rules. 
(2) If for any reason the peraon arrested cannot be promptly returned to 
the county and the charge against the defendant IB a misdemeanor for 
which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under 
Subjection 77-7-21Q), he may state in writing that he desires to forfeit 
bail, waive trial in the district in which the information is pending, and 
consent to disposition of the case in the county in which he was arrested, 
held, or present. 
(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in 
which the information is pending shall transmit the papers in the pro-
ceeding or copies of them to the clerk of the court for the county in which 
the defendant is arrested, held, or present. The prosecution shall continue 
in that county. 
(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the 
warrant. 
(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misde-
meanor for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a 
conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1), he shall be taken without unnec-
essary delay before a magistrate within the county of arrest for the deter-
mination of bail under Section 77-20-1 and releaaed on bail or held with-
out bail under Section 77-20-1. 
(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the 
offense, with the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate. 
(d) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon 
the defendant's first appearance before him, inform the defendant: 
(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy to 
him; 
(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the infor-
mation and how to obtain them; 
(3) of his right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court 
without expense to him if he is unable to obtain his own counsel; 
(4) of his rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and 
(5) that he is not required to make any statement, and that the state-
ment* be does make may be used against him in a court of law. 
(e) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under paragraph 
(d) and before proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and 
opportunity to consult counsel and shall allow him to contact any attorney by 
any reasonable means, without delay and without fee. 
(f) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate 
shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea. 
(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magis-
trate as provided by law. 
(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not 
be extended except for good cause ahown. Trial ahall be held under these 
rules and law applicable to criminal cases. 
(g) (1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, he may not be called on to 
enter a plea before the committing magistrate. During the initial appear-
ance before the magistrate, the defendant ahall be advised of his right to a 
preliminary examination. If the defendant waives his right to a prelimi-
nary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate 
ahall order the defendant bound over to answer in the district court. • 
(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the 
magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. The examination 
ahall be held within a reasonable time, but not later than ten days if the 
defendant is in custody for the offense charged and not later than 30 days 
if he is not in custody. These time periods may be extended by the magis-
trate for good cause shown. A preliminary examination may not be held if 
the defendant is indicted, 
(h) (1) A preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and laws 
applicable to criminal cases tried before a court The state has the burden 
of proof and ahall proceed first with its case. At the eonclueion of the 
atate's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and 
present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine the witnesses 
against him. 
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe 
that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has 
committed it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be 
bound over to answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause 
may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on 
the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly 
raised at the preliminary examination. 
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the 
crime charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, 
the magistrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defen-
dant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
an order of dismissal. The riisrmssfll and discharge do not preclude the 
state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense 
(i) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either 
party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses 
not to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is con-
cluded. On the request of either party, the magistrate may order all spectators 
to be excluded from the courtroom, 
(j) (1) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district 
court, the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall 
transmit to the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records 
made of the proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, record-
ings, and any typewritten transcript. • 
02) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sher-
iff, the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order, 
(k) (1) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material 
witness in a case pending before him will not appear and testify unless 
bond is required, he may fix a bond with or without sureties, and in a sum 
lie considers adequate, for the appearance of the witness. 
(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the 
court, the magistrate may commit him to jail until he complies or is 
otherwise legally discharged 
(3) If the witness does provide bond when required, be may be exam-
ined and cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the 
defendant and his testimony shall be recorded. He shall then be dis-
charged. 
(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent 
hearing or trial when ordered to do eo, the recorded testimony may be 
used at the hearing or trial in lieu of the personal testimony of the wit-
ness. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993.) 
Amendment Notts. —» tbe 1993 amend* 
mtnt, effective May 1,1993, rented the tuheV 
f»o& designation*, tubetituting letters far 
eumben and vice versa and changing an inter-
na] reference accordingly, and deleted "under 
Section 77.7-19" from the end ef the first ten-
tenet in Subdivision (b). 
Croee-Refereneos. — Court importers, 
I 76*66*1.1 et eeq 
Exclusion of witnetaet tad others, I 7S»7«4. 
Juvenile enrnrmtfang felony, bearing and ear-
fenestra to cbttnet court, I 76-3a-25. 
Juvenile court, transfer of criminal proceed-
ing to, I 76*Sa*18 
Police lineup, right to have attorney present, 
I 77-6-2 
preliminary examination may he waived, 
Utah Const, Art I Sec 13 
Right* of accused persons, Utah Const, Art 
1, Sect 7 to 12, I 77*1-6 
Rule* of Evidence inapplicable to proceed* 
hagi for bail, Rule 1101, UJLE 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, if 76-3-201, 
76*6-204, 764*301. 
